A contribution to the agenda for the dutch chairmanship of the OSCE : a recapitulation of findings by Beuningen, Frank van
143
Outono-Inverno 2002
N.º 103 - 2.ª Série
pp. 143-153
A Contr ibut ion  to  the  Agenda  for
the  Dutch Chairmanship of  the  OSCE:
a  R e c a p i t u l a t i o n  o f  F i n d i n g s
Frank van Beuningen
Conselheiro, Conselho de Assuntos Internacionais, Haia*
Resumo
A CSCE tinha como principal objectivo, duran-
te a Guerra Fria, ser um fórum de discussão das
duas superpotências. Uma vez terminada esta
conjuntura internacional, os Estados membros
da actual OSCE ainda não lhe definiram o seu
novo papel e responsabilidades. A ambiguidade
desta organização é ainda agravada pelo facto
de haver no seu seio uma divisão entre os seus
membros: entre aqueles que fazem parte da
NATO e da UE e os que não fazem. Estas duas
organizações vieram retirar em parte a impor-
tância política que a OSCE detinha.
A OSCE poderá contudo ter um papel impor-
tante na estratégia de prevenção de conflitos
funcionando como plataforma para troca de
informação entre as várias organizações, que já
estão no terreno, assim como continuará a ser
um fórum de consulta e discussão importante
devido ao seu cariz securitário multidimen-
sional.
Abstract
During the Cold War the CSCE had as a main goal
to be a forum of discussion for the two super powers.
Once this international setting was over, member
states were not able to define a new role and
responsibilities for it. The ambiguity of the
organization is even more aggravated by the fact
there is no clear distinction between those, which are
NATO and EU member states, and those who are
not. These two organizations diminished the political
importance of the OSCE.
The OSCE may have an important role on a strategy
of conflict prevention working as platform to exchange
information among several organisations, already
on the field, as well as it will keep being an important
forum of consultation and discussion due to its
multidimensional securitarian nature.
* The Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) is an advisory body for the Dutch government and parliament.
In particular its reports address the policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence, the Minister
for Development Co-operation and the State Secretary of Foreign Affairs. In the middle of 2001 the Dutch government
asked the AIV to produce an advisory report on the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the
light of the Dutch Chairmanship of the organisation in the year 2003. The following article is a recapitulation of the
findings and recommendations of the AIV as presented to the Dutch government on 3rd May 2002.
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Introduction
The evaporation of the East-West conflict has put an end to the need for the Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe OSCE (or the CSCE, as it used to be called) to act
as a meeting place for the two power blocs. It is no longer self-evident that the OSCE should
be the principal platform for consultation and dialogue, particularly as there are plenty of
other forums at which the former Eastern and Western allies can now meet. Given that the
role of a meeting place between East and West was the main reason for the CSCE’s
existence during the Cold War, it is hardly surprising that its successor, the OSCE, is now
immersed in uncertainty as to its future role and responsibilities. The participating States
have not managed to find suitable alternatives to fill the gap left at the OSCE by the ending
of the East-West conflict.
Despite the introduction of such catch-all terms as ‘comprehensive security’ and ‘co-
-operative security’, there is still a lack of cohesion in the wide range of disparate activities
performed by the OSCE. Indeed, the terms in question are so all-encompassing that they
have not helped to harmonise the security interests of the various participating States.
The reform and expansion of NATO and the European Union are casting an ever larger
shadow before them. The OSCE is now dividing into two separate camps: on the one hand,
there are the Member States of these two organisations and those countries that seem likely
to join them in the near future; on the other hand, there are the other countries, for whom
no such prospect beckons.
As US-Russian relations improve, as more countries join NATO and the European
Union and as the two organisations become more actively involved in matters affecting
European security, so the OSCE will gradually tend to lose its political significance.
The operation of the OSCE is based on the political will of the participating States to
subject their international relations and their domestic policies to common, political
agreements. These impose limitations on states’ political freedom, given that states are
expected to observe certain agreed standards of behaviour, both vis-à-vis each other and
in relation to their own citizens. Whilst the participating States do not always succeed in
upholding these standards, they remain the benchmarks by which their conduct is judged.
If participating States fail to meet the standards (as in Chechnya and the former Yugoslavia,
and as in the case of the ‘frozen conflicts’), they may be called to account for their conduct
in the OSCE. Nonetheless, the OSCE is not capable of enforcing a certain standard of
behaviour. It is important to realise that this tradition of consultation that has gradually
come into being during the years of the OSCE’s existence has helped to canalise political
A Contribution to the Agenda for the Dutch Chairmanship of the OSCE: a Recapitulation of Findings
146
change, both in Europe as a whole and in individual countries, and has an inherent value
for this reason.
The dimensions of the OSCE
The AIV believes that the OSCE tends to lean too heavily on past successes in the arena
of arms control. The AIV advises the Dutch Chairmanship to consider, and to discuss in the
OSCE, which of the existing agreements on arms control should be prioritised. It is also
absolutely vital that the Forum for Security Co-operation should keep in touch with the
debates and consultations at the OSCE in general, and within the Permanent Council in
particular. Precisely how this is done (i.e. whether the Forum does the groundwork for the
Permanent council or whether the two consultative bodies are fully merged) is of lesser
importance than the fact that the OSCE’s security policy dimension continues in full force.
If the Forum for Security Co-operation loses touch, it is at risk of becoming a political
irrelevance.
The AIV believes that the OSCE’s primary objective, as part of the Economic and
Environmental Dimension (EED), should be to prevent and contain conflicts. The OSCE
can seek to attain these goals by acting as a catalyst in conjunction with other international
organisations that are active in the fields of economics and/or the environment. Thanks to
their mandates, expertise and experience, such organisations may be in a better position
than the OSCE to take effective, targeted action in this area. In this connection, the OSCE
should operate basically as a platform for exchanging information on activities with other
international organisations that are active in the fields of economics and the environment.
The organisations involved here would include, for example, the European Union, the
World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, the EBRD and the United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe. The OSCE should focus its efforts on those countries which are unlikely to
qualify for membership of the European Union in the near future, as it is these countries
that will probably be most open to assistance and support offered by the OSCE as part of
a conflict prevention strategy.
The AIV would like to draw the following conclusions:
• The current position occupied by the OSCE leads the AIV to conclude that the OSCE
– acting partly as a complement to and partly in conjunction with other international




• The OSCE offers a genuine platform for permanent consultation between the
participating States. This tradition of consultation is valuable in itself. In addition,
the OSCE is the only regional organisation for co-operation on security issues of
which the US and the Russian Federation are members on equal terms. Another
important point is the membership of the Central Asian countries.
• The concepts of ‘comprehensive security’ and ‘co-operative security’ are so
wide-ranging as to be scarcely capable of defining the limits of the OSCE’s activities
and responsibilities. Moreover, the OSCE operates in three different dimensions,
each of which has its own particular characteristics and dynamics. In other words,
the OSCE is a regional organisation that has the mandate and expertise that are
required to tackle security issues from a broad perspective. The other side of the
coin, however, is that the OSCE encompasses a huge variety of tasks and activities.
The OSCE has an important role to play, for example, in relation to policing, election
observation, security policy and the human dimension, each aspect of which has a
bearing on the security situation in Europe. At the same time, these responsibilities
are so diverse that it is not always clear what the OSCE’s focus is or should be. As
a result, the OSCE may be said to be an organisation that performs a large number
of disparate activities the relationship between which is not always clear and in
respect of which it is also not always clear why the OSCE in particular should
perform them.
• The AIV urges the Dutch government to prioritise, during its Chairmanship of the
OSCE, the themes of conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation, based on
the OSCE’s expertise in relation to the security dimension, the economic and
ecological dimension, and the humanitarian dimension. Designating conflict
prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation as policy spearheads should also make it
easier to set priorities in terms of the OSCE’s responsibilities and activities. Any new
activities it is proposed the OSCE should undertake its work in the field of conflict
prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation.
Decision-making
The AIV concludes that decision-making in the OSCE revolves around its status as a
conference with a minimum of rules and procedures as well as a segmented set of
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decision-makers, and that the expansion of the European Union and NATO is having the
effect of drawing a line in the OSCE between the Member States and prospective Member
States of these two organisations on the one hand, and those countries that are unlikely to
qualify for membership in the near future on the other. Given that most of the latter
countries are located in regions in which OSCE missions have recently been undertaken
(where such missions have not actually been conducted in the countries in question), it
would not be going too far to claim that the OSCE is in fact divided into two camps.
The AIV urges the Dutch Chairmanship to ensure that the question of raising the efficiency
of decision-making remains on the OSCE’s agenda. The AIV is aware that agreement has not
been reached in the past on proposals made by delegations in this connection. Most countries
are unwilling to abandon the principle of consensual decision-making. For this reason, a
proposal has been made for a procedure (i.e. the institution of a ‘committee of wise men’) that
could promote change by applying pressure from the outside.
The AIV believes that the members of the OSCE should be prepared to invest in the
relationship with the Russian Federation. Indeed, any failure to treat Russian criticism of
the OSCE as a serious matter could easily be construed as ill will. It goes without saying
that each individual complaint made by the Russians should be assessed on its own merits.
At the same time, the AIV urges the Dutch Chairmanship to do its utmost to facilitate a
proper discussion of issues that have been exercising the minds of Western Europeans,
despite the fact that certain partners may be reluctant to discuss them, and may perhaps
even be opposed to any form of discussion. Such issues include religious freedom, the
integration of ethnic minorities, the deplorable position of many Roma and Sinti groups in
Western Europe, and xenophobia.
Chairmanship
The Dutch government can boost the Netherlands’ chance of success during its
Chairmanship of the OSCE by guaranteeing:
1 a high standard of expertise in issues that are on the OSCE’s agenda, in particular in
relation to areas in which the OSCE has performed missions;
2 adequate political and diplomatic groundwork in devising a strategy for tackling
these issues; it is vital in this respect that the Chairman-in-Office is sufficiently aware
of the concerns of all the members of the OSCE;
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3 sufficient staffing levels, both in Vienna and The Hague, and both fast and high-quality
communication between The Hague and Vienna;
4 sufficient financial resources to fund new initiatives and projects;
5 the Minister of Foreign Affairs should be the political embodiment of the
Chairmanship. This should be reflected in a high level of personal commitment and
personal activity. After all, the Minister of Foreign Affairs represents the highest
political authority in the organisation. He, rather than the Chair of the Permanent
Council, is the OSCE’s public face. In this connection, it is also important that the
Dutch Chairmanship of the OSCE should be supported by the entire cabinet, as other
ministries apart from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may be called upon to perform
certain OSCE duties during the Netherlands’ term of office.
The experience gained by previous Chairmen-in-Office of the OSCE leads the AIV to
conclude that developments in the international arena will be the main determinants of the
way in which the Netherlands discharges its responsibilities as the Chairman-in-Office of
the OSCE. In other words, the role performed by the Chairman-in-Office revolves around
the latest international developments. Against this background, it is crucial that the Dutch
government should take steps to enable the Chairman-in-Office to respond swiftly and
effectively to international trends.
The experience of the Norwegian Chairman-in-Office demonstrates in particular
the importance of ensuring that the OSCE unit in The Hague and the delegation in
Vienna work in parallel with each other. This can only be done on the basis of clear
arrangements about the division of responsibilities. Also, the experience of previous
Chairmen-in-Office underlines the value of ensuring that both the head of the OSCE
unit in The Hague and the Permanent Representative in Vienna (having due regard for
their own individual powers and responsibilities) have direct access to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs. This is the only way of guaranteeing that the Minister of Foreign
Affairs can act effectively and decisively in discharging his role as the Chairman-in-
-Office of the OSCE. This is on condition, though, that communication between The
Hague and Vienna is both open and fast.
To ensure that the Dutch Chairmanship is both effective and efficient, the AIV
recommends that the delegation in Vienna should make maximum use of ‘groups of
friends’, ‘open-ended working groups’ and ‘special representatives of the
Chairman-in-Office’. The use of such groups should help both to create broad support for
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decisions taken by the OSCE and to ensure that other participating States, apart from the
Chairmanship, remain closely involved in the work of the OSCE.
The AIV advises the Dutch Chairmanship, in strengthening the position of the Secretary
General and the Secretariat, to restrict itself to a number of small-scale but concrete
measures that the Chairman-in-Office is capable of taking on its own accord. More
specifically, the Netherlands has in the past supported the principle of strengthening the
Secretariat. The AIV proposes in this connection that, for the benefit of future Presidencies,
the staff complement of the OSCE Secretariat should be supplemented by as many staff as
are required to enhance its continuity. In a similar manner to the role performed by
Programme Officers in relation to missions, the prime duty of these additional members of
staff should be to guarantee the continuity of OSCE policy under successive
Chairmen-in-Office. They should not concern themselves with the OSCE’s operational
duties and should instead concentrate on supporting the Chairman-in-Office in preparing
decision making in Vienna. As long as this suggestion has not been adopted, the Netherlands
could consider strengthening the Secretariat by seconding Dutch officials to the Secretariat
at its own expense.
Political and public support
As a first step on the road to boosting political support for the OSCE, the Dutch
Chairmanship could propose that the acting Chairman-in-Office should not only set out,
to OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly, its strategy for the Chairmanship and the plans it
wishes to implement at the beginning of its term of office, but it should also report, at the
end of its term of office, on the results that have been achieved during the past year of its
Chairmanship. As long as there is insufficient support for this suggestion, the Dutch
Chairman-in-Office could put it into practice on a voluntary basis.
The AIV also recommends that the OSCE should strengthen its public information
activities and should develop a public information policy. The Dutch Chairmanship could
take action to this end, for example, by proposing to earmark a higher proportion of the
OSCE budget for public information purposes on a permanent basis. Another possibility
would be to examine ways and means of integrating public information into all aspects of
the OSCE’s work, including the activities conducted by the OSCE in the field, for which the




The AIV advises the Dutch Chairmanship to standardise procedures for reporting on
missions to the Permanent Council in Vienna, and to establish a fixed mechanism for
discussing the reports.
The AIV also advises the Dutch government to advocate the idea of placing a time limit
on future OSCE missions, notably by stipulating a deadline by which the objectives of the
mandate pertaining to the mission in question must have been achieved. This will compel the
parties involved and all other OSCE participating States, to a much greater extent than is
currently the case, to pursue a political dialogue about the situation in the host country. In
addition, setting a time limit will have the effect of forcing the governments of the countries
concerned and the heads of missions, to a greater extent than is currently the case, to achieve
both political and other objectives by stipulated deadlines, thus giving Vienna a greater
degree of control over the missions. Finally, steps could be taken to ascertain which of the
missions currently in operation could be subjected to a time limit along comparable lines.
Finally, with a view to exercising proper control over the missions, the AIV advises the
Dutch Chairmanship to continue the practice of inviting the Programme Officers from the
Secretariat to attend discussions of the missions. The Romanian Chairmanship first
instituted this practice in 2001. There is every reason for the Dutch Chairmanship to
continue this practice, also as it can help to strengthen the Secretariat and improve
cooperation between the Chairmanship and the Secretariat.
Issues and the strengthening of the OSCE
The AIV advises the Dutch government to exercise caution in formulating its objectives
for its Chairmanship of the OSCE, not so much because of any dearth of ideas or
suggestions, but rather because practical experience shows that there are only very limited
opportunities for individual countries to influence OSCE policy. Moreover, the need to
respond effectively to international developments and to guarantee the continuity of the
OSCE’s activities will in itself inevitably create a richly filled agenda that is bound to
require a great deal from the Dutch Chairmanship. As regards ideas and suggestions for
issues to be raised by the Dutch Chairmanship, the Dutch government should take its lead
from the OSCE’s current agenda and from the German-Dutch proposals presented in the
spring of 2001.
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The AIV calls upon the Dutch Chairmanship to launch a debate within the OSCE
on the desirability of conducting independent evaluations of the organisation’s
activities, in particular of missions. The aim would be to identify the strengths and
weaknesses of the OSCE’s operations and to draw conclusions for future operations.
The precise nature of the evaluation unit is not the most important aspect here; the key
issue is that a debate should be started. The UN’s Lessons Learned Unit could serve
as a model in this respect.
The AIV advises the Dutch government to ensure that human rights violations in
Central Asian countries remain on the OSCE’s political agenda during the term of its
Chairmanship. The governments in question should be warned that such violations are
contrary to the values, standards, rules and arrangements agreed within the OSCE. The
Chairmanship will need to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether silent diplomacy or
political pressure forms the most effective means of improving the human rights situation
in these countries.
The AIV urges the Dutch government to use its Chairmanship in 2003 to give a fresh
impetus to the debate on the legal status of the OSCE.
The analysis of the AIV begs the question of whether the OSCE is not at risk of having
its operational capability eroded. If this were the case, the OSCE would lose its political
relevance and would run the risk of becoming irrelevant. This is a danger of which many
participating States are aware and is also the reason why the issue of internal reform has
been raised at regular intervals. As different participating States have different ideas about
the type of reform that is needed, the debate generally founders before any progress can
be made. After all, the participating States have disagreed for many years now about the
reform and renewal of the OSCE, despite claims that the organisation cannot otherwise
function effectively. Perhaps external pressure can bring about the type of progress that
internal discussion has thus far failed to produce.
The AIV proposes that the Dutch Chairmanship should argue in favour of the
formation of a representative, international group of wise men, whose task it would
be to examine the reform and renewal of the OSCE. The group’s mandate should in
any event include defining the limits of the OSCE’s responsibilities and duties,
thereby making allowance for the possibility of shedding certain responsibilities and
joining forces with other organisations. Other issues to be examined by the group are
the continuity of the OSCE’s operations in the light of the annual rotation of the
Chairmanship, and the organisation of the decision-making process. Not only should
the group of wise men be representative of the community constituting the
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organisation’s participating States, it should also carry sufficient political clout to
make it difficult for the participating States to ignore its recommendations. The group
should submit regular progress reports to the Permanent Council in Vienna before
presenting a final report suggesting ways in which the OSCE’s Ministerial Council
meeting scheduled for December 2003 could reach agreement on the reform and
renewal of the organisation.
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